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In the beginning, it was simple. Or at least it seemed thatway from so many different national vantages that it was
hard to dispute. The war in Asia had been a war between
‘good guys’ and ‘bad guys,’ and while opinions in different
places varied on who exactly to count among the good guys,
in places as politically and socially diverse as China, Indone-
sia, the Soviet Union, India, the United States, Korea, and
the Netherlands, there was strikingly little disagreement over
who the bad guys had been, at least at the national level. Even
as the fragile ‘anti-fascist’ alliance of the wartime Allies (and
their colonial subjects) gave way to the stark global opposi-
tions of the Cold War, even as bitter colonial wars flared up
in Vietnam, Indonesia, and elsewhere, anti-colonial nation-
alist leaders, (former) imperialists, peasants, government
officials, businessmen, capitalists and communists around
the globe - including a substantial number of Japan’s own
citizens - could agree on this as few other things: Imperial
Japan had been the villain of wartime Asia. Promising to lead
Japan and Asia to a brighter future free of Western domina-
tion, but harbouring a hyper-imperialist and ‘ultra-nation-
alist’ sense of racial and cultural superiority and a brutal
indifference to human life and dignity, the marauding Japan-
ese - like their fascist allies in Europe - had brought only
oppression, death and destruction to Asia and, ultimately,
to themselves. Against these enemies of civilization, free-
dom, and progress, war with the Western Allies and resist-
ance from the peoples of Asia had been the only possible
recourse.
There were, of course, from the beginning, major differences
in how the war was narrated, interpreted, and explained. The
early, momentous decision of the American occupation
authorities to retain the Japanese emperor, with a correspon-
ding narrative that essentially included him as one of the war’s
‘good guys’, provoked dissent worldwide, and - as noted by sev-
eral of the contributors to this special issue - left a deeply
ambiguous legacy on the question of Japanese war responsi-
bility within Japan itself. Another area of immediate dis-
agreement involved characterizations of Japan’s Western oppo-
nents. In such venues as the Tokyo war crimes trials,
spokesmen for the victorious Western powers - carrying on in
the vein of Allied wartime propaganda - comfortably cast the
Asia-Pacific War in the black and white terms of a struggle of
‘civilization’ versus ‘barbarism’, of ‘democracy’ versus ‘fas-
cism’, of ‘freedom’ versus ‘tyranny’. But while they largely
agreed with Allied characterizations of wartime Japan, many
outside the West, as well as those to the left of the political
spectrum the world over, were more skeptical regarding the
West’s own aims and motives in Asia before, during, and after
the war. Missing from this story, for them, was an acknowl-
edgement of the fundamentally imperialist identity of the
combatants on both sides, and the fundamental nature of the
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war in Asia, as such, as a showdown between imperialists over
territories and peoples that neither side in fact had a right to
claim. 
This difference in perspective reflected stark divisions between
the worldviews of (former) Western colonizers – who preferred
to treat imperial Japan as a purely exceptional case, thus main-
taining a healthy distance between its aggressive history and
their own colonial pasts and presents – versus (former) Asian
colonized, who could not help noting the ironies of such an
exercise. It was also a reflection of the gap between the world-
views of liberal capitalism dominant in the Anglo-American
metropoles, versus those of Marxism-Leninism (in particular
its critique of imperialism) more influential elsewhere, includ-
ing much of the colonized world. 
In the aftermath of the war, there were also profound dif-
ferences between societies’ relative emphases on the war
experience and its meanings. In places such as Indonesia
and Vietnam, armed conflicts with returning Western colo-
nizers and the priority on national unity very quickly made
the Japanese occupation period seem yesterday’s news, rel-
egating its historical significance to that of a mere interlude
or preliminary to what now came assuredly (back) into focus
as the ‘main story’ in national terms: the ongoing, ultimately
triumphant, struggle for independence against Western
domination. Portia Reyes’ contribution to this issue reveals
how the Japanese occupation period was soon represented
as an ‘interruption’ in the dominant Philippine national
story, and as Rana Mitter observes in his essay, a similar
process of narrative backgrounding occurred in postwar
China, albeit with largely internal causes: the great domes-
tic showdown between the communist and nationalist forces
that followed on the heels of the Japanese occupation quick-
ly pushed the events of the Sino-Japanese war period to the
sidelines of historical narrative. This does not mean that the
Japanese period was forgotten, but rather that its narratives
and meanings were subordinated, reduced and compressed
into a national history whose main thrust and climax lay else-
where. In Japan itself, in contrast, the war remained ‘the’
inevitable turning point in narratives of identity and histo-
ry, perennially marking the boundary between past and pres-
ent in national as well as individual terms. This is not to say
that stories of the war in Japan were any less simplified,
reshaped, suppressed, or otherwise subordinated to postwar
political considerations, but rather simply to highlight the
relatively heightened degree of narrative and political weight
attached to such retellings.
Postwar pathologies
Amidst these and other local variations, around the globe
there remained certain striking formulaic similarities in how
the story of the Asia-Pacific War was told in the postwar,
spanning every manner of political and cultural boundary.
The first of these was a general tendency to explain Japan-
ese wartime actions in terms of Japan’s presumed ‘excep-
tional’ nature and/or cultural and institutional ‘immaturi-
ty’. Even among the most thoughtful and informed observers
in different parts of the world – at different ends of the polit-
ical spectrum – there was a common assumption that Japan’s
behavior in Asia had been, first, unusual in its oppressive-
ness and brutality; and second, that this had been fostered
by a certain ‘incompleteness’ in Japan’s development as a
modern nation-state and society, a situation that had allowed,
even encouraged, the persistence of certain ‘pre-modern’ or
‘semi-feudal’ cultural peculiarities distinctive to Japan. Qual-
ities frequently mentioned in this context included blind
obedience to authority, racism, xenophobia, provincialism,
conformism, anti-individualism, readiness for self-sacrifice,
and a tendency to violence.
Within this general interpretive pattern, dominant around the
globe at least through the 1970s, there were, of course, great
differences of emphasis. Most scholars of Japan agreed, for
example, that the imperial state had been a major culprit in
determining Japan’s disastrous course, monopolizing and dic-
tating the terms of national loyalty, militarizing Japan’s mass-
es, and inhibiting the development of independent institu-
tions of bourgeois civil society and independent thinking as
seen in more advanced parts of the world – assisted in this
aim, again, by the persistence of ‘feudalistic’ attitudes among
the Japanese people. Japanese scholars generally saw the war
as an inevitable consequence of fundamental social deficien-
cies dating back to the nature of the 1868 Meiji Restoration,
and indeed continuing into the postwar present. Reflecting a
dominant Marxian bent, most of these did not stop at the vil-
lainy of the state or the military as such, but attempted to
explain Japan’s disastrous imperial course by focusing on the
specific needs of an expanding but immature Japanese capi-
talism and its interdependent relationship with ‘semi-feudal’
landed and military interests from the time of the Meiji set-
tlement onwards. They saw the military showdown with the
Western powers in the Pacific as a reactionary attempt to shore
up this ‘emperor system’ (tennôsei) in crisis, in the context of
a global crisis of capitalism. In contrast, mainstream Anglo-
American scholars of the 1950s-70s such as Edwin O. Reis-
chauer were more sanguine, arguing that Japan’s prewar devel-
opment had shown signs of promise in a healthy, democratic,
liberal capitalist direction, only to be hijacked by militarist
thugs who took advantage of a subservient public, social insta-
bility due to the growing pains of economic development, and
as-yet insufficiently autonomous public institutions.
Whatever the great differences between these dominant Japan-
ese and Anglo-American storylines, one ironic correspondence
between them was that by placing the onus of the war on
Japan’s ‘ruling classes’ (variously defined) in combination with
a certain general social and cultural underdevelopment, both
narratives in their own ways carried on in the vein of the Tokyo
war crimes trials in casting the Japanese people as victims of
a sinister state, effectively absolving the mass of the Japanese
people from direct responsibility for the war. The war
remained not so much something that ordinary Japanese had
done to others, but rather something that had been done to,
or happened to, ordinary Japanese. Throughout the postwar
period, this problem of what Carol Gluck has called ‘history
in the passive voice’ helped undergird a pervasive Japanese
reticence regarding questions of war responsibility. The fact
that Japan’s citizenry remained the only people of the world
subjected to the unspeakable horror of two atomic bombings
added ammunition to a sense of general victimhood. 
Further to the political right, the tendency to reticence on
Japan’s own war culpability was also fueled by conservative
domestic interests including politicians and bureaucrats as
well as veteran’s and ‘bereaved family’ groups – important
constituencies of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party – who
maintained that the vilification of wartime Japan at the hands
of historians, social activists, and governments the world
over represented a distortion of history, little more than ‘vic-
tor’s justice’, propaganda spread by Japan’s enemies both
internal and external. As Peter King’s essay here further
explores, the combined result has been a Japanese state and
society that has had notorious problems in coming to terms
with the war in any unambiguous sense, problems that con-
tinue to dog Japan’s relations with its immediate Asian
neighbours in particular. 
Yet as Rikki Kersten also observes in this issue, the distress-
ing dominance of this official conservative line should not be
allowed to obscure the longstanding existence of less visible
domestic voices of opposition on the war responsibility front,
including progressive intellectuals who sought, from as early
as the 1950s, to transcend the troubling passivity common to
both right and left-wing historical paradigms and seek the way
forward to a more responsible and autonomous public life
through a discourse of individual subjectivity. Still, until more
recently, the main subjects of these debates on subjectivity
remained Japan’s intellectual elite, with the implied immatu-
rity and passive victimhood of the Japanese masses in the war
period remaining an inevitable byproduct. 
Loaded narratives
Whatever their shared shortcomings and omissions, these
competing historical narratives were invested with an energy
and urgency that betrayed them as much more than a simple
academic exercise. Indeed it can be argued that where the Asia-
Pacific War was concerned, the difficulty in moving beyond
starkly opposed, simplistic narratives of villains and victims -
or, in the case of state-approved textbooks, beyond a deafen-
ing silence on the whole subject – was testimony not to any
characteristic Japanese inability to deal in a sophisticated way
with the past, but rather to the continuing, profoundly con-
tentious political implications carried by these narratives in the
making of postwar Japan and its national identity. In sum, how
you characterized the prewar order - who your victims and vil-
lains were, what aspects of the system you identified as the
true culprits of the war – was also, inevitably, a commentary
on the postwar order, on where Japan should go from here. 
All the more so in a cold war world in which stark national
choices had to be made. If the global capitalist system in gen-
eral and Japanese capitalism in particular had been at the heart
of the wartime fiasco, for example, then it hardly made sense
to maintain a close postwar alliance with the capitalist U.S., or
to be content with the relatively cosmetic changes the U.S. had
made to the Japanese capitalist system during its occupation –
all the while continuing to maintain a dangerous distance
between Japan and its Asian neighbours, most importantly
China. And vice versa. Thus were postwar politics and histori-
cal narrative inexorably intertwined, leaving very little room for
nuance or ambiguity, a situation in which the state and its rep-
resentatives often took the easiest path by saying little or noth-
ing at all. Cary Karacas’ essay here, sketching the convoluted
history of a monument to the victims of the 1945 Tokyo fire-
bombing, is a vivid illustration of the tortured, contested nature
of such attempts at representation in postwar Japan.
While fingers thus remained for the most part deservedly
pointed at Japanese for failing to take an objective reckoning
of their wartime past, however, it was also difficult to see the
global postwar landscape of history and memory as an entire-
ly level playing field where ‘coming clean’ was concerned. For
while many eyes focused on Japan, distortion, manipulation
and simplification of the wartime experience for political pur-
poses – albeit with varying levels of devotion to scholarly ‘objec-
tivity’ – was in fact globally endemic in a postwar, cold war
world of nation-states attempting to (re-) establish legitimacy
and superpowers battling for new influence. The Tokyo war
crimes trials offered a blatant early example – even now pro-
viding ammunition to Japan’s revisionist right wing – by insist-
ing, against most of the historical evidence, on the existence
of a long-term prewar Japanese plot to take over Asia and ulti-
mately the world, while refusing to acknowledge any wrong-
doing or culpability for the war on the side of the Western
powers. 
But there were more subtle transgressions as well. As histo-
rian John Dower revealed in a feisty 1975 critique of the post-
war American Japan studies establishment, for example, it
was more than coincidental that American scholars such as
Reischauer had offered a narrative of Japan’s war as a mis-
taken detour on an otherwise steadily ascending path towards
a successful, democratic modernity. For, as Dower showed,
these scholars were convinced of the merits of the American
(liberal capitalist) social model, eager to see it fostered in Japan,
and thus determined not to leave the writing of Japan’s mod-
ern history to ‘ideological’, ‘biased’ left-wing Japanese schol-
ars who, they believed, sought to employ history to undermine
the U.S.-sponsored postwar order, the U.S.-Japanese alliance,
and, ultimately, the American position in Asia.
the war in Asia was a showdown between imperialists
over territories and peoples that neither side had a
right to claim
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domination and consolidate their political hegemony
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Meanwhile, in the many new Asian nations emerging from
the wartime wreckage, the subordination of historical narra-
tives of the war period to political considerations and the
‘national interest’ was, if anything, more pronounced. For
nationalist elites seeking to throw off colonial domination and
consolidate their political hegemony in societies in which the
colonial period, the war, and its aftermath had left socially divi-
sive legacies along lines of class, culture, ethnicity, and poli-
tics, there was a high premium on stark, heroic ‘us’ versus
‘them’ accounts of Japanese ‘oppression’ versus national
‘resistance’. The heady optimism of independence – along
with the near universal postwar equation of anti-colonial
nationalism with the world-historical forces of human liber-
ation and progress – only provided further ammunition to the
creation of black-and-white narratives, with the emergent anti-
colonial nation as their heroic subject.
Within this uncompromising framework, there was little room
to contemplate the war’s more ambiguous, multiple experi-
ences, meanings, and legacies. In places such as Indonesia,
scholars and popular interpreters alike incorporated the Japan-
ese occupation period into the new national mythology as a
sort of divinely ordained national trial-by-fire, from which the
nation was destined to emerge like a boomerang against the
returning Western imperialists, stronger and more united
than ever. Prominent people who had openly supported the
Japanese and were politically expendable, like Jorge Vargas in
the Philippines, faced condemnation as ‘traitors’ and ‘collab-
orators’. But as Kyu Hyun Kim observes in this issue in the
case of South Korea, the compromisingly close wartime asso-
ciation of many members of now dominant social classes with
the Japanese ‘enemy’ – including subsequent national lead-
ers such as Suharto and Park – was a subject that most con-
temporary students of history preferred to shy away from.
Where the nationalist interaction with the Japanese had been
too prominent to be ignored – as in the case of Sukarno and
Hatta in Indonesia – nationalist interpreters often sought to
turn this sort of potentially divisive historical legacy into anoth-
er nation-building strength, by presenting wartime associa-
tion with the Japanese as a purely strategic and ultimately fruit-
ful maneuver, proof of the infallible political and historical
sense of the nation’s leadership. The narrow, unforgiving
parameters of ‘collaboration’ and ‘resistance’ allowed little
room for anything in-between.
But how to contain the problem of ‘collaboration’ and secure
nation-building lessons from the war experience when, at least
from the standpoint of the postwar rulers, the entire nation
itself had been on the ‘wrong side’ in the war? As Mike Lan-
shih Chi demonstrates here in the case of Taiwan, the answer
was to import a nationalist mythology from the mainland,
effectively erasing the Taiwanese people from their own
wartime history in the process. Ironically, the exigencies of
nation-building seeped into wartime narratives across the geo-
graphical and political divide of the Taiwan Straights as well:
As Joshua Howard observes in his contribution to this issue,
even in the ostensible ‘workers state’ of the  People’s Repub-
lic of China, narratives of unified national resistance against
the Japanese served to obscure a dynamic wartime history of
class struggle and contestation in the urban areas under
nationalist control. 
The war in the post-postwar
In more recent times, as the standpoint of Chi, Kim, and other
contributions to this special issue illustrate for different
national contexts, the passage of the wartime generation from
the political stage, the end of the Cold War and concomitant
weakening of political orthodoxies, and the transition from
postwar to ‘post-postwar’ national orders in more general polit-
ical, economic, social, and cultural terms, has brought a new
openness to re-interpretations of ourselves, societies, and the
world, inevitably opening up new angles and vantages on his-
tory as well. Across the globe, rising demands for social and
political inclusion among newly assertive groups traditional-
ly left out of the nation-building game, such as women and
minorities, have prompted the construction of more inclusive
and heterogenous histories. While varying widely from place
to place, the overall trend has been a slow but steady de-
mythologizing of the nation as historical subject, and the pur-
suit of alternative historical narratives, processes and actors
formerly excluded from view. This has included increased
attention to cross-border, ‘transnational’ historical processes
and interactions, to the lives of ordinary people, to moral ambi-
guity, and to identity as shifting, multiple, negotiated, inter-
dependent, and contingent.
Nationalism remains, of course, a profoundly powerful force
in a world of competing nation-states, no more so than in the
postcolonial world. But even here, postcolonial nationalism’s
failure to fulfill its early transcendent, unifying promise and
the passing of the old guard has encouraged a new willing-
ness to critique and transgress the rigid, static boundaries and
categories of orthodox nationalist thinking, and nationalist
histories. Indeed, given the special vantage of postcolonial
social contexts on the colonial relationship and its ambiguous
transnational legacies, it is perhaps not surprising that the
expanding field of postcolonial studies, pioneered and spear-
headed by scholars of the South Asian subcontinent, has been
at the cutting edge of many of these historiographical inno-
vations.
These developments have had important implications for the
study of modern Asian history, including the Asia-Pacific War
period. One result has been the highlighting of interactive,
transnational workings of social and cultural formation in
Japan’s colonial encounters, moving beyond stark categories
of oppression, resistance, and ‘collaboration’ to discover inter-
ests and processes that embraced people and institutions on
both sides of the line dividing nation from nation and colo-
nizer and colonized. In the case of modern Japan specifically,
growing scholarly skepticism regarding nation-centered nar-
ratives generally has been expressed in a growing identifica-
tion of, and assault on, ‘Orientalist’, exceptionalist assump-
tions about modern Japan that were, as noted above,
near-universal to the discipline through the early postwar
period. 
Studies such as Louise Young’s path-breaking Japan’s Total
Empire, for example, offered an exploration of Japan’s 1930s
and 40s colonization of Manchuria, not as a result of Japan’s
inherently exceptional, aggressive, underdeveloped qualities
as a ‘late modernizer’, but rather as a result of Japan’s very
modernity. Manchukuo thus appears as an illuminating local
inflection of the modern processes and inter-workings of
industrial capitalist development, the state, mass society, and
empire-building - in sum, as a site of modern global history in
the making. Here, as in Yoshimi Yoshiaki’s path-breaking
Grass-Roots Fascism: The War Experience of the Japanese People
(Kusa no ne no fashizumu: Nihon minshû no sensô taiken), the
history of the war is told from the social ‘bottom up’ as well as
from the ‘top down,’ revealing Japanese from all walks of life
not only as passive victims, but also as active participants in
the war effort, thus treading a field of moral and political ambi-
guity previously off-limits on both right and left in Japan.
Whether focusing on the war experience itself, or on ways in
which that history has been narrated in the postwar, many of
the essays collected in this special issue reflect the contem-
porary trend of strategically focusing on history’s hidden ‘grey
areas’, ‘margins’, ‘intersections’ and ‘border crossings’. In
their own ways, Owen Griffith’s consideration of prewar Japan-
ese children’s literature, Yiman Wang’s essay on the actress
Li Guo Ren/Yamaguchi Yoshiko, Katarzyna Cwiertka’s dis-
cussion of the war’s legacy to Japanese eating habits, Remco
Raben’s assessment of Japanese attempts to establish legiti-
macy in Borneo, Christian Uhl’s considerations on the ‘Kyoto
School’, Steven Murray’s analysis of Pelilieu residents’ mem-
ories of the Asia-Pacific War, and Pei Yin-Lin’s treatment of
unheralded Taiwanese wartime literature, highlight the logic
of this shift in emphasis. Each represents an attempt not sim-
ply to illuminate areas and linkages excluded from view in con-
ventional, nation-centered narratives, but to offer, in so doing,
new angles on, and constructions of, the ‘main story’ of the
war and its aftermath in the Asia-Pacific.
Sixty years on - with the arrival of the post-postwar order, and
the consequent, inevitable loosening of the postwar order’s
political and cultural hold over our view of the world - it might
not perhaps be overly optimistic or self-absorbed to argue that
these are encouraging times for the fashioning of new, more
nuanced and sophisticated perspectives on the Asia-Pacific
War and its legacies. But around the globe, contemporary pol-
itics and worldviews have always intervened, and will
inevitably continue to intervene, in shaping depictions of this
most profound of modern conflicts. The ratcheting contem-
porary tensions between Japan and China over the wartime
past indicate that Chinese and Japanese neo-nationalist sen-
timents may be at a postwar peak. Of course this development
says much more about changing contemporary domestic and
regional power balances than about the war experience itself.
And indeed, if there is any clear ‘take home’ message to be
learned from examining the changing, varied, but also some-
times similar ways of telling the story of the war around the
globe over the last six decades, it is to confirm Benedetto
Croce’s timeless maxim: All history is, in the end, a history of
the present. <
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